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Abstract
The choice of priors may become an insoluble problem if priors and
Bayes’ rule are not seen and accepted in the framework of subjectivism.
Therefore, the meaning and the role of subjectivity in science is consid-
ered and defended from the pragmatic point of view of an “experienced
scientist”. The case for the use of subjective priors is then supported
and some recommendations for routine and frontier measurement ap-
plications are given. The issue of reference priors is also considered
from the practical point of view and in the general context of “Bayesian
dogmatism”.
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1 Introduction
The main resistance scientists have to Bayesian theory seems to be due to their
reaction in the face of words such as “subjective”, “belief” and “priors” (to
which the word “bet” might also be added). These words sound blasphemous
to those who pursue the ideal of an objective Science. Given this premise, it
is not surprising that frequentistic ideas, which advertise objective methods
at low cost in a kind of demagogical way, became popular very quickly and
are still the most widely used in all fields of application, despite the fact that
they are indefensible from a rational point of view. As in commercials, what
often matters is just the slogan, not the quality of the product, at least in the
short term. And advertised objective methods are certainly easier to sell than
subjective ones. When one adds to these psychological effects yet others based
upon political reasons (see, for example, the very interesting philosophical and
historical introduction to Lad’s book [1]), life gets really hard for subjective
probability. Moving from the slogan to the product, it is not difficult to see
that, if they were to be taken literally, frequentistic ideas would lead nowhere.
Indeed their success seems due to a mismatch between what they state and how
scientists interpret them in good faith. In other words, frequentistic methods
make sense only if they are - when they can be - reinterpreted from a subjective
point of view. Otherwise they may cause serious mistakes to be made. In recent
years I have investigated this question among particle physicists [2, 3]. For the
convenience of the reader, I report really here the main conclusions which I
reached [3]:
- there is a contradiction between a cultural background in statistics
and the good sense of physicists; physicists’ intuition is closer to the
Bayesian approach than one might na¨ıvely think;
- there are cases in which good sense alone is not enough and serious
mistakes can be made; it is then that the philosophical and practi-
cal advantages offered by the Bayesian approach become of crucial
importance;
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- there is a chance that the Bayesian approach can become widely ac-
cepted, if it is presented in a way which is close to physicists’ intuition
and if it can solve the “existential” problem of reconciling two aspects
which seem irreconcilable: subjective probability and the honest ideal
of objectivity that scientists have.
This last point was just sketched in the original paper, and I would like to
discuss it here in a bit more detail, and to relate it to the “problem” of priors,
the main subject of this article. I think, in fact, that it is impossible to talk
about priors without putting them into the framework to which they belong.
Only when one is aware of the role they have in Bayes’ theorem, and of the
role of Bayes’ theorem itself, can one have a relaxed relationship with them.
Once this is achieved, depending on the specific problem, one may choose the
most suitable priors or ignore them if they are irrelevant; or one may decide,
instead, that priors are so relevant that only Bayes’ factors can be provided;
alternatively one may even skip the Bayes theorem altogether, or use it in a
reverse mode to discover which kind of of priors might give rise to the final
beliefs that one unconsciously has. These situations will be illustrated by
examples.
Before going any further, some clarifications are in order. First, my com-
ments will be from the viewpoint of the “experienced scientist” (i.e. the scien-
tist who is used to everyday confrontation with real data); this point of view
is often neglected, since priors (and questions of subjectivity/objectivity) tend
to be debated among mathematicians, statisticians and philosophers. Second,
since I am an experimental particle physicist, I am aware that my knowledge
about the literature concerning the arguments I am going to talk about is nec-
essarily limited and fragmentary. I therefore apologize if people who may have
expressed opinions similar to those stated in this paper are not acknowledged
here.
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2 Subjective degrees of belief and objective
Science
The question “can subjective degrees of belief build an objective Science?” is
subtle. If we take it literally, the answer is NO. But this is not because of the
subjective degrees of belief in themselves. It is simply because, from a logical
point of view, “objective Science” is a contradiction in terms, if “Science”
stands for Knowledge concerning Nature, and “objective” for something which
has the same logical strength as a mathematical theorem. This has been
pointed out many times by philosophers, the strongest defence of this point of
view being due to Hume [7], to whom there is little to reply.
If, instead, “objective Science” stands for what scientists refer to by this ex-
pression, the question becomes a tautology. In fact, using Galison’ words [8],
“experiments begin and end in a matrix of beliefs. . . . beliefs in instrument
types, in programs of experimental enquiry, in the trained, individual judge-
ments about every local behaviour of pieces of apparatus. . . ”. Any scientist
knows already that the only objective thing in science is the reading of digital
scales. When we want to transform this information into scientific knowledge
we have to make use of many implicit and explicit beliefs.
However, many scientists are reluctant to use the word “belief”1 for pro-
fessional purposes. It seems to me that the reason for this attitude is due to
a misuse of the word “belief”, which has somehow led to a deterioration of its
meaning. In this connection I think a few remarks are of particular impor-
tance. The first is that we should have Hume’s distinction between “belief”
and “imagination” clear in mind [7]. Then, once we agree on what “belief”
is, and on the fact that it can have a degree, and that this degree depends
necessarily on the subject who evaluates it, another important concept which
1But many other scientists, usually prominent ones, do. And, paradoxically, objective
science is, for those who avoid the word ”belief”, nothing but the set of beliefs held by the
most influential scientists in whom they believe. . .
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enters the game is that of de Finetti’s “coherent bet” [4]. The “coherent bet”
plays the crucial role of neatly separating “subjective” from “arbitrary”. In
fact, coherence has the normative role of forcing people to be honest and to
make the best (i.e. the “most objective”) assessments of their degree of belief2.
Finally comes Bayes’ rule [9], which is the logical tool for updating degrees of
belief.
In my opinion there is a really good chance that this way of presenting the
Bayesian theory will be accepted by scientists. In fact the ideal of objectivity
is easily recovered, although in terms of intersubjectivity, if scientific knowl-
edge is regarded as a very solid Bayesian network [10] (Galison’s “matrix of
beliefs” [8]), based on centuries of experimentation, with fuzzy borders which
correspond to the areas of current investigation.
3 Choosing priors: fear, misconception and
good faith
Once we have specified the exact meaning of each of the ingredients entering
probabilistic induction (degree of belief - coherent bet - Bayes’ rule), there
should, in principle, no longer be a problem. However, all Bayesians know by
experience that the most serious concerns scientists have are related to the
choice of priors (sometimes due to real technical problems, but more often due
only to “prejudices on priors”). In fact, practitioners can avoid talking about
“degree of belief” in their papers, replacing it by the nobler term “probability”;
they can accept the use of Bayes’ theorem, because it is a theorem; but it
seems they cannot escape from priors. And they often get stuck, or simply
go back to “objective” frequentistic methods. In fact, the choice of the prior
is usually felt to be a vital problem by all those who approach the Bayesian
2The coherence is also important to avoid making the confusion between “belief” and
“convenience” (or “wish”). In other words, the tasks of assessing probability and of decision
making should be kept separate.
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methods with a purely utilitarian spirit, that is, without having assimilated the
spirit of subjective probability. Some use “Bayesian formulae” simply because
they “have been proved”, by Monte Carlo simulation, to work in a particular
application. Others seem convinced by the power of Bayesian reasoning, but
they are embarrassed because of the apparent “arbitrariness” of the choice of
priors.
It might seem that reference priors (see e.g. [11] and references therein,
although in this paper I will refer only to Jeffreys’ priors [6], the most common
in Physics applications) have a chance of attracting people to Bayesian theory.
In fact, reference priors enable practitioners to avoid the responsibility for
choosing priors, and give them an illusion of objectivity analogous to that
offered by frequentistic procedures [12]. However I have some perplexity about
uncritical use of reference priors, for philosophical, sociological and practical
reasons which I am now going to explain.
3.1 Bayesian dogmatism and its dangers
Although I agree, in principle, that a “concept of a ‘minimal informative’ prior
specification - appropriately defined!” [11] is valid, those who are not fully aware
of the intentions and limits of reference analysis perceive the Bayesian approach
to be dogmatic. Indeed, one can find indiscriminate use and uncritical recom-
mendation of reference priors in books, lecture notes, articles and conference
proceedings on Bayesian theory and applications. This gives to practitioners
the impression that only those priors blessed by the official Bayesian litera-
ture are valid. This would be a minor problem if the use of reference priors,
instead of more motivated ones, merely caused a greater or lesser difference in
the numerical result. However, the question becomes more serious when the -
perhaps unwanted - dogmatism is turned against the Bayesian theory itself. I
would like to give an example of this kind which concerns me very much, be-
cause it may influence the High Energy Physics community to which I belong.
In a paper which appeared last year in Physical Review [13] it is stated that
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“For a parameter µ which is restricted to [0,∞], a common non-informative
prior in the statistical literature is P (µt) = 1/µt. . . In contrast the PDG
3description
is equivalent to using a prior which is uniform in µt. This prior has no basis
that we know of in Bayesian theory.”
This example should be taken really very seriously. The authors, in fact, use
the pulpit of a prestigious journal to make it seem as if they understand deeply
both the Bayesian approach and the frequentistic approach and, on this basis,
they discourage the use of Bayesian methods (“We then obtain confidence
intervals which are never unphysical or empty. Thus they remove an original
intention for the description of Bayesian intervals by the PDG” [13]).
So it seems to me that there is a risk that indiscriminate use of reference
priors might harm the Bayesian theory in the long term, in a similar way
to that which happened at the end of last century, as a consequence of the
abuse of the uniform distribution. This worry is well expressed in Earman’s
conclusions to his “critical examination of Bayesian confirmation theory” [15]:
“We then seem to be faced with a dilemma. On the one hand, Bayesian
considerations seem indispensable in formulating and evaluating scientific
inference. But on the other hand, the use of the full Bayesian apparatus
seems to commit the user to a form of dogmatism”.
3.2 Unstated motivations behind Jeffreys’ priors?
Coming now to the specific case of Jeffreys’ priors [6], I must admit that, from
the most general (and abstract) point of view, it is not difficult to agree that
“in one-dimensional continuous regular problems, Jeffreys’ prior is appropri-
ate” [11]. Unfortunately, it is rarely the case that in practical situations the
status of prior knowledge is equivalent to that expressed by the Jeffreys’ pri-
ors, as I will discuss later. Reading “between the lines”, it seems to me that
3PDG stands for “Particle Data Group”, a committee that every second year publishes
the Review of Particle Properties [14], a very influential collection of data, formulae and
methods, including sections on Probability and Statistics.
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the reasons for choosing these priors are essentially psychological and socio-
logical. For instance, when utilized to infer µ (typically associated with the
“true value”) from “Gaussian small samples”, the use of a prior of the kind
f◦(µ, σ) ∝ 1/σ has two apparent benefits:
• first, the mathematical solution is simple (this reminds me of the story
of the drunk under the streetlamp, looking for the key lost in the dark
alley);
• second, one recovers the Student distribution, and for some it seems to
be reassuring that a Bayesian result gets blessed by “well established”
frequentistic methods. (“We know that this is the right solution”, a
convinced Bayesian once told me. . . )
But these arguments, never explicitly stated, cannot be accepted, for obvious
reasons. I would like only to comment on the Student distribution. This is the
“standard way” for handling small samples, although there is, in fact, no deep
reason for aiming to get such a distribution for the posterior. This becomes
clear to anyone who, having measured the size of this page twice and having
found a difference of 0.3 mm between the measurements, then has to base his
conclusion on that distribution. Any rational person will refuse to state that,
in order to be 99.9% confident in the result, the uncertainty interval should be
9.5 cm wide (any carpenter would laugh. . . ). This might be the reason why,
as far as I know, physicists don’t use the Student distribution.
Another typical application of the Jeffrey’ prior is in the case of inference on
the λ parameter of a Poisson distribution, having observed a certain number of
events x. Many people have, in fact, a reluctance to accept, as an estimate of λ,
a value which differs from the observed number of counts (for example, E(λ) =
x + 1 starting from a uniform prior) and which is deemed to be distorted by
the “distorted” frequentistic criteria used to analyse the problem (see e.g. [2]).
In my opinion, in this case one should simply educate the practitioners about
the difference between the concept of maximum belief and that of prevision (or
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expected value). An example in which the choice of priors becomes crucial, is
the case where no counts are observed, a typical situation for frontier physics,
where new and rare phenomena are constantly looked for. Any reasonable
prior consistent with what I like to call the “positive attitude of the physicists
who have pursued the research” [2], allows reasonable upper limits compatible
with the sensitivity of the experiment to be calculated (even a uniform prior
is good for the purpose). Instead, a prior of the kind f◦(λ) ∝ 1/λ prevents use
of probabilistic statements to summarize the outcome of the experiment, and
the same result (0 ± 0) is obtained, independently of the size sensitivity and
running time of the experiment.
I will return below to such critical situations which are typical of frontier
science.
4 Priors for routine applications
Let us discuss now the reasons which indicate that experimentally motivated
priors for “routine measurements” are quite different from Jeffreys’ priors. This
requires a brief reminder about how measurements are actually performed. I
will also take the opportunity to introduce the International Organization for
Standardization (ISO) recommendations concerning measurement uncertainty.
4.1 Unavoidable prior knowledge behind any measure-
ment
To understand why an “experienced scientist” has difficulty in accepting a
prior of the kind f◦(σ) ∝ 1/σ (or f◦(ln(σ)) = k), one has to remember that
the process of measurement is very complex (even in everyday situations, like
measuring the size of the page You are reading now, just to avoid abstract
problems):
• first one has to define the measurand, i.e. the quantity one is interested
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in;
• then one has to choose the appropriate instrument, one which has known
properties, well-suited range and resolution, and in which one has some
confidence, achieved on the basis of previous measurements;
• the measurement is performed and, if possible, repeated several times;
• then, if one judges that this is appropriate, one applies corrections, also
based on previous experience with that kind of measurement, in order to
take into account known (within uncertainty) systematic errors;
• finally4 one gets a credibility interval for the quantity (usually a best
estimate with a related uncertainty);
Each step involves some prior knowledge and, typically, each person who per-
forms the measurement (be it a physicist, a biologist, or a carpenter) operates
in his field of expertise. This means that he is well aware of the error he might
make, and therefore of the uncertainty associated with the result. This is also
true if only a single observation has been performed5: try to ask a carpen-
ter how much he believes in his result, possibly helping him to quantify the
uncertainty using the concept of the coherent bet.
There is also another important aspect of the “single measurement”. One
should note that many measurements, which seem to be due to a single obser-
vation, consist, in fact, of several observations made within a short time: for
example, measuring a length with a design ruler, one checks the alignment of
the zero mark with the beginning of the segment to be measured several times;
4This is not really the end of the story, if a researcher wishes his result to have some
impact on the scientific community. Only if other people trust him will they use the result
in further scientific reasoning, as if it were their own result. This is the reason why one has
to undergo an apprenticeship during one’s youth, when one must build up one’s reputation
(i.e. again beliefs) in the eyes of one’s colleagues.
5This defence of the possibility of quoting an uncertainty from a single measurement has
nothing to do with the mathematical games like those of [16].
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or, measuring a voltage with a voltmeter or a mass with a balance, one waits
until the reading is well stabilized. Experts use unconsciously also information
of this kind when they have to figure out the uncertainty they attribute to the
result, although they are unable to use it explicitly because this information
cannot be accommodated in the standard way of evaluating uncertainty based
on frequentistic methods [3].
The fact that the evaluation of uncertainty does not necessarily come from
repeated measurements has also been recognized by the International Organi-
zation for Standardization (ISO) in its “Guide to the expression of uncertainty
in measurement” [17]. There the uncertainty is classified
“into two categories according to the way their numerical value is estimated:
A. those which are evaluated by statistical methods6;
B. those which are evaluated by other means;”
Then, illustrating the ways to evaluate the “type B standard uncertainty”, the
Guide states that
“the associated estimated variance u2(xi) or the standard uncertainty u(xi)
is evaluated by scientific judgement based on all of the available information
on the possible variability of Xi. The pool of information may include
- previous measurement data;
- experience with or general knowledge of the behaviour and properties
of relevant materials and instruments;
- manufacturer’s specifications;
- data provided in calibration and other certificates;
- uncertainties assigned to reference data taken from handbooks.”
It is easy to see that the above statements have sense only if the probability
is interpreted as degree of belief, as explicitly recognized by the Guide:
6Here “statistical” should be seen as referring to “repeated observations on the same
measurand”, and not to general meaning of “probabilistic”.
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“. . . Type B standard uncertainty is obtained from an assumed probability
density function based on the degree of belief that an event will occur [often
called subjective probability. . . ].”
It is also interesting to read the concern of the Guide regarding the uncritical
use of statistical methods and of abstract formulae:
“the evaluation of uncertainty is neither a routine task nor a purely math-
ematical one; it depends on detailed knowledge of the nature of the mea-
surand and of the measurement. The quality and utility of the uncertainty
quoted for the result of a measurement therefore ultimately depend on the
understanding, critical analysis, and integrity of those who contribute to
the assignment of its value”.
This appears to me perfectly in line with the lesson of genuine subjectivism,
accompanied by the normative rule of coherence.
4.2 Rough modelling of realistic priors
After these comments on measurement, it should be clear why a prior of the
kind f◦(µ, σ) ∝ 1/σ does not look natural. As far as σ is concerned, this prior
would imply, in fact, that standard deviations ranging over many (“infinite”, in
principle) orders of magnitude would be equally possible. This is unreasonable
in most cases. For example, measuring the size of this page with a design
ruler, no one would expect σ ≈ O(10 cm) or ≈ O(1µm). As for µ, the choice
f◦(µ) = k is acceptable until σ ≪ µ (the so called Savage principle of precise
measurement [18]). But when the order of magnitude of σ is uncertain, the
prior on µ should also be revised (for example, most of the directly measured
quantities are positively defined).
Some priors which, in my experience, are closer to the typical prior knowl-
edge of the person who makes routine measurements are those concerning the
order of magnitude of σ, or the order of magnitude of the precision (quantified
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by the variation coefficient v = σ/|µ|). For example7, one might expect a r.m.s.
error of 1 mm, but values of 0.5 or 2.0 mm would not look surprising. Even 0.2
or 4 mm would look possible, but certainly not 1µm or 10 cm. So, depending
on whether one is uncertain on the absolute or the relative error, a distribution
which seems suitable for a rough modelling of this kind of prior is a lognormal
in either σ or v. For instance, the above example could be modeled with lnσ
normally distributed with average 0 (= ln 1) and standard deviation 0.4. The
1, 2 and 3 standard deviation interval on σ/mm would be [0.7, 1.5], [0.5, 2.2]
and [0.3, 3.3], respectively, in qualitative agreement with the prior knowledge.
In the case of more sophisticated measurements, in which the measurand
is a positive defined quantity of unknown order of magnitude, a suitable prior
would again be a normal (or, at limit, a constant) in lnµ (before the first
measurement one may be uncertain on the order of magnitude that will be
obtained), while σ is somehow correlated to µ (again v can be reasonably
described by a lognormal). One might imagine of other possible measurements
which give rise to other priors, but I find it very difficult to imagine a real
situation for which Jeffrey’s priors are appropriate.
4.3 Mathematics versus good sense
The case of small samples seems to lead to an impasse. Either we have a
simple and standard solution to a fictitious problem, given by the Student
distribution, or we have to face complicated calculations if we want to solve
specifically the problem we have in mind, formulated by modeling experience
motivated priors. I do not think that experimenters would be willing to cal-
culate lognormal integrals to report the results of a couple of measurements.
This could be done once, perhaps, to get a feeling of what is going on, or to
solve an academic exercise, but certainly not as routine.
7For the sake of simplicity, let us stick to the case in which the fluctuations are larger
than the intrinsic instrumental resolution. Otherwise one needs to model the prior (and the
likelihood) with a discrete distribution.
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The suggestions sketched above were in the framework of the Bayes’ the-
orem paradigm. But I don’t want to give the impression that this is the only
way to proceed. The most important teaching of subjective probability is that
probability is always conditioned by a given status of information. The prob-
ability is updated in the light of any new information. But it is not always
possible to describe the updating mechanism using the neat scheme of the
Bayes’ theorem. This is well known in many fields, and, in principle, there
is no reason for considering the use of the Bayes theorem to be indispensable
to assessing uncertainty in scientific measurements. The idea is to force the
expert to declare (using the coherent bet) some quantiles in which he believes
is contained the true value, on the basis of a few observations. It may be easier
for him to estimate the uncertainty in this way, drawing on his past experience,
rather than trying to model some priors and playing with the Bayes’ theorem.
The message is what experimentalists intuitively do: when you have just a few
observations, what you already know is more important than what the standard
deviation of the data teaches you.
Some will probably be worried by the arbitrariness of this conclusion, but
it has to be remembered that: an expert can make very good guesses in his
field; 20, 30, or even 50 % uncertainty in the uncertainty is not considered
as significantly spoiling the quality of a measurement; there are usually many
other sources of uncertainty, due to possible systematic effects of unknown size,
which can easily be more critical. I am much more worried by the attitude
of giving up prior knowledge to a mathematical convenience, since this can
sometimes lead to paradoxical results.
4.4 Uniform prior for µ, λ and p in routine measure-
ments
I find, on the other hand, that for routine applications the use of the uniform
distribution for the center parameter of the normal distribution, usually asso-
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ciated to the true value, is very much justified. This is because, apart from
pathological situations, or from particular cases in frontier research, even if
one does not know if the associated uncertainty will be 0.1, 1, or 10%, the
prior knowledge on µ is so vague that it can be considered uniform for all
practical purposes. The same holds when one is interested in λ of a Poisson
distribution (counting experiments) or to p of the binomial distribution (mea-
surements of proportions), under the condition that normal approximation is
roughly satisfied, which is a kind of desideratum for the planning of a good
routine experiment (otherwise it becomes a non-routine one). Taking into ac-
count the fact that, for routine measurements, the difference between mode
and average of the final distribution is much smaller than σ(λ) or σ(p), we
“recover” maximum likelihood results, but with a natural, i.e. subjective, in-
terpretation of the results. This corresponds, in fact, to the case where the
intuitive “dog-hunter probability inversion” [2, 3] is reasonable. For example,
indicating by x the number of observed events in the case of Poisson distribu-
tion or of successes in the case of the binomial one, with the number of trials
of the latter indicated by n, we get, simply
λ ∼ N (x,√x) (1)
p ∼ N

x
n
,
√
x
n
(
1− x
n
)
1
n

 , (2)
where N (·, ·) is short hand for normal distribution of given average and stan-
dard deviation.
The recommendation I usually like to give, to check “a posteriori” if the
uniform prior is suitable or not is the following: first evaluate central value and
standard deviation according to the approximations (1) and (2); then try to
judge if the central value “disturbs” you, and/or the standard deviation seems
to be of the order of your prior vagueness; if this is the case, it is now that
you need to model down some priors, which will actually affect the posteriors;
otherwise, priors will have no appreciable effect and the approximated result
is good enough.
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This “a posteriori’ consideration of priors might seem questionable, but
I find it absolutely consistent with the spirit of subjective probability. In
fact, the priors one has plug into Bayes’ theorem should reflect the status of
knowledge as it is felt to be by the subject who performs the inference. But
sometimes it can be difficult to model this information consciously, or it might
simply take too much time. The comparison of the approximate result got
from a uniform prior with the result that the researcher was ready to accept
can help, indeed, to raise this status of prior knowledge from the unconscious
to the conscious.
5 Priors for frontier science
The question is completely reversed when one is interested in quantities whose
value might be at the edge or beyond the sensitivity of the experiment (per-
haps even orders of magnitudes beyond it) and if the quantity itself makes
sense at all. This is a typical situation in particle physics or in astrophysics,
and it is only to these kind of measurements that I will refer to as “frontier
science measurements”. However, even though they are “frontier”, most of the
measurements performed in the above mentioned fields belong, in fact, to the
class of “routine measurements”.
I would like to illustrate this new situation with a numerical example. Let
us imagine that an experiment has been run for one year looking for rare events,
like magnetic monopoles, proton decays, or gravitational waves. The physics
quantity of interest (i.e. a decay rate, or a flux) is related to the intensity r
of a Poisson process. Usually there is also an additional Poisson process to
be considered, associated with the physical or instrumental background which
produces observables indistinguishable from the process of interest (rB). The
easy, although ideal, case is when the background is exactly zero and at least
one event is observed. This case prompts researchers to make a discovery claim.
Let us consider, instead, the situation when no candidate events are observed,
16
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Figure 1: Final distribution for the Poisson intensity parameter r, obtained from a
uniform prior and with the following values of expected background and observed
events: 0, 0 (continuous); 1, 1 (dashed); 1, 5 (dotted).
still with zero background. The likelihood, considering 1 year as unit time, is
f(x = 0 | r) = e−r. Considering a uniform prior for r, we get f(r | x = 0) = e−r
(see figure 1), from which a 95% probability upper limit (ru) can be evaluated.
This comes out to be ru = 3 events/year and it is a kind of standard way
in HEP of reporting a negative search result8. The usual interpretation of
this result is that, if the process looked for exists at all, then there is 95%
probability that r is not greater than ru. But, I find that often one does not pay
enough attention to all the logical implications contained in this statement, or
in all the infinite probabilistic statements which can be derived from f(r | x =
0). This can be highlighted considering statements complementary to the
standard ones, especially in those cases in which the experimenters feel that
the detector sensitivity is not suitable for searching for such a rare process.
8It is worth noting that many physicists are convinced that the reason for this value is
due to the fact that the probability of getting 0 from a Poisson of λ = 3 is 5%. This is
the classical arbitrary probability inversion [3] which in this case comes out to be correct,
assuming a flat prior, due to the property of the exponential under integration.
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The embarrassing reply to questions like “do you really believe 5% that r is
greater than ru?”, or “would you really place a 1 to 19 bet on r > ru” shows
that, often, f(r | x = 0) does not describe coherent beliefs. And this is due to
the fact that the priors were not appropriate to the problem. For example, a
researcher could run a cheap monopole experiment for one day, using a 1 m2
detector, find no candidates and present, without hesitation, his 95% upper
limit as ru = 3monopoles/m
2/day, or 1095monopoles/m2/year. But he would
react immediately if we made him aware that he is also saying that there is
5% chance that the monopole flux is above 1095monopoles/m2/year, because
he knows that O(1000)m2 detectors have been run for many years without
observing a convincing signal.
The situation becomes even more complicated when one has a non zero
expected background and a number of observed candidates superior to it. For
example, researchers could expect a background of 1 event per day and observe
5 events. Differently from the above example of the monopole search, let us
imagine that the prior knowledge is not so strong that all the 5 events can
be attributed with near certainty to background. Instead, let us imagine that
the experimenters are here in serious trouble: the p-value is below 0.5%; they
do not believe strongly that the excess is due to the searched for effect; but
neither do they feel that the probability is so low that they can decide not
to publish the result and miss the chance of a discovery. If they perform a
standard Bayesian analysis using a flat prior they will get a final distribution
peaked at 4 which looks like a convincing signal, since it seems to be well
separated from 0 (see figure 1). They could use, instead, a Jeffreys’ prior and
find no result, since P (r ≤ r◦)/P (r > r◦) = ∞ for any r◦ > 0. It is easy
to see that in such a situation pedantic use of the Bayesian theory (“Prior,
Likelihood → Final”) leads to an embarrassing outcome whatever one does.
Therefore, in the case of real frontier science observables, the best solu-
tion seems to be that one has to abstain from providing final distributions
and publish only likelihoods, which are degrees of beliefs too, but they are
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much less critical than priors. But reporting the likelihoods as such can be
inconvenient, because often they do not give an intuitive and direct idea of
the power of different experiments. Recently, faced with problems of the kind
described above, I have realized that a very convenient quantity to use is a
function that gives the Bayes factor of a generic value of interest with respect
to the asymptotic value for which the experimental sensitivity is lost (if the
asymptotic value exists and the Bayes factor is finite)[19, 20, 21]. In the simple
case of the Poisson process with background that we are considering, we have
R(r) ≡ f(x | r, rB)
f(x | r = 0, rB) (3)
The advantage of this function is that it has a simple intuitive interpretation
of shape distortion function of the p.d.f. (or a relative belief updating ratio9)
introduced by the new observations. As long as R is 1 it means that the
experiment is not sensitive and the shape of the p.d.f. (and hence the relative
beliefs) remain unchanged. Instead, when R goes to zero the beliefs go to zero
too, no matter how strong they were before. Moreover, since the R differs
from the likelihood only by a multiplicative factor, it can be used directly
in the Bayes’ formula when a scientist wants to turn them into probabilities,
using subjective priors. Different experiments can easily be compared and the
combination of independent data is performed multiplying the different R’s.
The function R is particularly intuitive when plotted with the abscissa in
log scale. For example, figure 2, shows the result in terms of the R function
for the same cases shown in figure 1. Looking at the plot, one can immediately
get an idea of what is going on. For example, it also becomes clear where the
problems with the flat prior and with the Jeffreys’ prior come from. We can
also now understand which kind of priors the hesitant researchers of the above
example had in mind. Their prior beliefs were concentrated some order of
9In fact, in the case f◦(r) 6= 0 one can rewrite (3) in the following way
R(r) = f(r |x, rB)/f◦(r)
f(r = 0 |x, rB)/f◦(r = 0) .
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Figure 2: Bayes factor with respect to r = 0 for the Poisson intensity parameter r
obtained from the following values of expected background and observed events: 0,
0 (continuous); 1, 1 (dashed); 1, 5 (dotted).
magnitudes below the peak of R, but with tails which could also accommodate
r ∼ O(4). This is in agreement with the fact that after the observations the
intuitive probability for r > O(1) becomes sizable (5, 10, 30%?) and the
researchers do not have the courage not to publish the result.
Finally, let us comment on upper (or lower) limits. It is clear now that,
exactly in those frontier situations in which the limit would be pertinent, a
highly intersubjective 95% probability limit does not exist. Therefore one has
to be very careful in providing such a quantity. However, looking at the plots of
figure 2 it is also clear that one can talk somehow about a bound of values which
roughly separates the region of “possible” values from that of “impossible”
ones. One could then take a conventional value, which could be the value for
which R = 0.05, or 0.5, or any other. The important thing is to avoid calling
this conventional value a 95% or a 50% probability limit. If instead one really
wants to give a probability limits, one has to go through priors, which should be
precisely stated. In this case, if I really had to recommend a prior, it would be
the uniform distribution. This is not, only, for mathematical convenience, but
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also because it seems to me that it can do a good job in many cases of interest.
In fact, one can see that it gives the same result as any other reasonable prior
consistent with the positive attitude of the researchers which have planned and
financed the experiment [2] (for example, if an experimental team performs
a dedicated proton decay experiment with the intention of making a good
investment of public money, it means that the physicists really do hope to
observe a reasonable amount of signal events for the planned sensitivity of the
experiment).
6 Conclusions
The key point expressed in this paper is that there is no need to “objectivise”
Bayesian theory, treating subjectivism as if it were something we should be
ashamed of. Only when this point is accepted and Bayes’ theorem is correctly
placed within the framework of subjective probability, with clear role and lim-
itations, can the anxiety about priors and their choice be overcome. Once
this is achieved, either we can choose the priors which best describe the prior
knowledge for a specific problem; or we can “ignore” them in routine appli-
cations, thus “recovering” maximum likelihood results, but with transparent
subjective interpretation, and with awareness of the assumptions we are using;
or we can decide that priors are so critical that only likelihoods or Bayes factors
can be provided as the outcome of the experiment; or we can use the Bayes
theorem in a reverse mode, to find out which priors we had, unconsciously,
that give rise to the beliefs we have after the new observation; finally there
are some cases in which it is even more practical to skip the Bayes’ theorem
and to assess directly the degree of belief. With respect to this last point, I
would like to remind the reader that, in fact, if one thinks that probabilities
must only be calculated using the Bayes’ rule, one gets trapped in an endless
prior-final chain.
As far as reference priors are concerned, they could, indeed, simplify the
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life of the practitioners in some well defined cases. However, their uncritical
use should be discouraged. First, because they could lead to wrong, or even
absurd, results in critical situations, if reference priors are preferred to case
motivated priors just for formal convenience. Second, and more important,
because of they might give the impression of dogmatism, which, together with
the absurd results obtained through their misuse, could seriously damage the
credibility of the Bayesian theory itself.
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